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Abstract Multi-person stopping games with players’ priorities are considered. Players ob-
serve sequentially offers Y1, Y2, . . . at jump times T1, T2, . . . of a Poisson process. Y1, Y2, . . .
are independent identically distributed random variables. Each accepted offer Yn results in a
reward Gn = Ynr(Tn), where r is a non-increasing discount function. If more than one player
wants to accept an offer, then the player with the highest priority (the lowest ordering) gets
the reward. We construct Nash equilibrium in the multi-person stopping game using the
solution of a multiple optimal stopping time problem with structure of rewards {Gn}. We
compare rewards and stopping times of the players in Nash equilibrium in the game with
the optimal rewards and optimal stopping times in the multiple stopping time problem. It is
also proved that presented Nash equilibrium is a Pareto optimum of the game. The game is
a generalization of the Elfving stopping time problem to multi-person stopping games with
priorities.
Keywords Stopping game · Nash equilibrium · Pareto-optimality · Multiple stopping
Suppose that a company is going to open m new departments that will be ordered (ranked)
according to their importance. Rank 1 denotes the most important department, and conse-
quently rank m refers to the least important one. So, the firm offers m secretary positions.
The applications will be considered up to a fixed deadline U . There is a selection com-
mittee that interviews candidates arriving one by one at jump times of a Poisson process.
We assume that candidates’ “skills” form a sequence of i.i.d. random variables with known
probability distribution. The selection process is organized similarly to the classical sec-
retary problem but taking into account the departments’ rankings. So, a candidate who is
being interviewed may be accepted for department 1; if she is rejected, she may be accepted
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for department 2, and so on until the first acceptance. Candidates rejected for department i
cannot be considered in the future. The aim is to select candidates with maximal expected
“skills”. So, one may say that each department acts as an independent player in a stopping
game with priorities.
We will formulate the problem as an m-person stopping game with priorities in which
random offers are presented at jump times of a homogeneous Poisson process. Such a game
has been considered in Ferenstein and Krasnosielska [8]. In this paper, we propose a new
solution and we prove that a proposed strategy is a Nash equilibrium, which allows removing
some assumption made in Ferenstein and Krasnosielska [8]. The difference between the
solution proposed in this paper and those in [8] will be more thoroughly discussed at the end
of the paper.
The game considered is a generalization, to the case of several players, of the optimal
stopping time problem formulated and solved first by Elfving [6], later considered also by
Siegmund [18]. Various modifications of the structure of the reward in the Elfving problem
were considered in Albright [1], David and Yechiali [3], Krasnosielska [12, 13], Gershkov
and Moldovanu [10], Parlar et al. [16].
Stadje [19] considered an optimal multi-stopping time problem in Elfving setting, in
which the final reward is the sum of selected discounted random variables. Various stop-
ping games with rewards observed at jump times of a Poisson process were considered in
Dixon [4], Enns and Ferenstein [7], Saario and Sakaguchi [17], Ferenstein and Krasnosiel-
ska [9]. Stopping games were introduced in seminal paper by Dynkin [5] as an application
of optimal stopping time problems, since then often referred as Dynkin games. An extensive
bibliography on stochastic games can be found in Nowak and Szajowski [15].
1 Multiple Stopping Time Problem
Let us recall the multi-stopping time problem presented in Stadje [19]. Let Y1, Y2, . . . be non-
negative independent identically distributed random variables with continuous distribution
function F and E(Y1) ∈ (0,∞), Y0 = 0. The random variables Y1, Y2, . . . are sequentially
observed at jump times 0 < T1 < T2 < · · · of a homogeneous Poisson process N(s), s ≥ 0,
with intensity function p(u) and T0 = 0. Moreover, assume that the sequences {Yn}∞n=1 and
{Tn}∞n=1 are independent. Let r : [0,∞) → [0,1] be a right continuous, non-increasing func-
tion satisfying the conditions
r(u + v) ≤ r(u)r(v), u, v ≥ 0, (1)
r(0) = 1, r(s) > 0 for s ∈ [0,U) and r(s) = 0 for s ≥ U , where U ∈ (0,∞). Assume that the
set of points of discontinuity of r is finite. Let Gn = Ynr(Tn), n ∈ N0, where N0 = N ∪ {0},
G∞ = 0.
Note that without loss of generality we can assume that p(u) ≡ 1 because a non-
homogeneous Poisson process can be reduced to a homogeneous Poisson process with in-
tensity 1 (see [2, pp. 113–114]).
Let Fn = σ(Y1, . . . , Yn, T1, . . . , Tn), n ∈ N, F0 = {∅,Ω}, F∞ = σ(⋃n∈N0 Fn). Let M be
the set of stopping times with respect to {Fn}∞n=0, and Mk(m) = {(τ 1, . . . , τm) : τ 1, . . . , τm ∈
M, k ≤ τ 1 < · · · < τm}, k ∈ N.
Note that the values of stopping times τ i are natural numbers and τ i = n means selecting
an offer arriving at time Tn.
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We are interested in finding an optimal m-stopping time for {Gn}∞n=1, that is, the m-
stopping time (τ 1,mk , . . . , τ
m,m









E(Gτ1 + · · · + Gτm),




+ · · · + Gτm,m
k
).
Interpretation The problem can be interpreted as a problem of selling m commodities of
the same type, where the offers are received sequentially and must be refused or accepted
immediately on arrival.
Let {s0, . . . , sl}, where 0 = s0 < s1 < · · · < sl−1 < sl = U , l < ∞, contains all points of
discontinuity of the discount function r . Let F¯ (s) = 1 − F(s) and H(s) = E(Y1I(Y1 > s)),
s ∈ R.
In the theorem below functions γ i determining the optimal expected and conditional
expected total reward are obtained.
Theorem 1 (Stadje [19])
1. There exist m unique functions γ 1(x) ≥ γ 2(x) ≥ · · · ≥ γ m(x), x ≥ 0, such that:
(i) For i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, the function γ i is continuous and has continuous derivative on
intervals (sj , sj+1), j ∈ {0,1, . . . , l − 1}.







γ 1(x)F¯ ( γ
1(x)
r(x)
) − r(x)H( γ 1(x)
r(x)




) − r(x)H( γ i (x)
r(x)
)
+ r(x)H( γ i−1(x)
r(x)
) − γ i−1(x)F¯ ( γ i−1(x)
r(x)
), if i > 1.
(iii) For each i, γ i(x) = 0 for x ≥ U .






supτ1∈M1(1) E(Gτ1), if i = 1,
sup(τ1,...,τ i )∈M1(i) E(
∑i
j=1 Gτj )
− sup(τ1,...,τ i−1)∈M1(i−1) E(
∑i−1
j=1 Gτj ), if i ≥ 2.
For k ∈ N and i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, define
τ i(k) = inf{n ≥ k : Gn ≥ γ i(Tn)
} (2)
and τ i(∞) = ∞.





τm(k), i = 1,
τm−(i−1)(τ i−1,mk + 1), i ∈ {2, . . . ,m}. (3)
The Markov time τ i,mk can be interpreted as a time of selling the ith commodity among
m commodities for sale, if we start the process of selling at the time of the kth observation.
Note that τ i,mk is the first time after the stopping time τ
i−1,m
k , at which the reward is not
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smaller than the optimal conditional expected reward from selling the ith commodity in the
future if we have i instead of i − 1 commodities for sale. Therefore, γ i(Tn) determines the
minimum acceptable offer of selling the m − i + 1-th commodity at time Tn. Hence, γ i is a
threshold below which it is not profitable to sell the m − i + 1-th commodity.
Theorem 2 (Stadje [19]) (τ 1,mk , . . . , τm,mk ) is an optimal m-stopping time in Mk(m) for the
sequence {Gn}∞n=0.
















+ · · · + Gτm,m
k






+ · · · + Gτm,m
k





where the last equality follows from Kösters [11, Lemma 5] and Stadje [19, p. 233]. 





















Note that from monotonicity of the sequence {γ i(·)}mi=1 we get
τm(k) ≤ τm−1(k) ≤ · · · ≤ τ 1(k) (5)
and from Theorem 2 we obtain
τ 1(k) ≤ τ 1(τm−1,mk + 1
) = τm,mk < ∞.





1 + τm−i+2(1 + τm−i+3(1 + · · · τm−1(1 + τm(k))))). (6)
Lemma 2 For k,m ∈ N, m ≥ 2, i ∈ {1, . . . ,m − 1} we have
τ
i+1,m
k = τ i,m−1τm(k)+1.
Proof Immediately from (6) for i ≥ 2 and from (3) for i = 1. 
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2 The Game
Suppose that there are m > 1 ordered players who sequentially observe rewards Gn at times
Tn, n = 1,2, . . . . Players’ indices 1,2, . . . ,m correspond to their ordering (ranking) called
priority so that 1 refers to the player with the highest priority and m to the lowest one. Each
player is allowed to obtain one reward at time of its appearance on the basis of the past and
current observations and taking into account the players’ priorities. More precisely, Player i,
say, who has just decided to make a selection at Tn gets the reward Gn if and only if he has
not obtained any reward before and there is no player with higher priority (lower order) who
has also decided to take the current reward. As soon as the player gets the reward, he quits
the game. The remaining players select rewards in the same manner, their priorities remain
as previously.
2.1 Model of the Game
In this section, we make the same assumptions and denotations as in Sect. 1. Moreover,
let D be the set of sequences of 0–1 valued {Fn}-adapted random variables. Let ψm,i =
{ψm,in }n∈N ∈ D be a strategy of Player i in the m-person game. If ψm,in = 1, then, at time of
observation of the nth offer, the decision of Player i is: I want to finish the game and take
the reward Gn. If ψm,in = 0, then his decision is: I continue the game.
We say that ψm is the profile of the m-person game, if ψm = (ψm,1, . . . ,ψm,m), where














= n, j ∈ {1, . . . , i − 1}}. (8)





) = E(Gσim(ψm)). (9)




















) = (ϕm,1, . . . , ϕm,i−1,ψm,i, ϕm,i+1, . . . , ϕm,m).
Let D1 ⊆ D be the set such that {pn}n∈N ∈ D1 if and only if {pn}n∈N ∈ D and on the set
{τm,m1 ≤ n} we have pn = 1, where τm,m1 is given in (3). Our aim is to find a Nash equilibrium
in the set Dm1 = D1 × · · · × D1︸ ︷︷ ︸
m
for the m-person game for which the reward for Player i is
Gσim(ψm), i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
Using Stadje’s result from Theorem 2, we have that m selected rewards which maximize
the expected total reward appear no later than τm,m1 . This motivates the searching of a Nash
equilibrium strategy in the set Dm1 .
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2.2 Construction of Nash Equilibrium
Define σ ki for k ∈ N ∪ {+∞} and i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} as follows:
σ k1 = τ 1(k), (10)
σ ki =
{
τ i(k), if τ i−1(k) > τ i(k),
σ
τi (k)+1
i−1 , if τ i−1(k) = τ i(k),
(11)
where σ+∞i = +∞.
Lemma 3 σ ki ≤ τ i,ik ≤ τm,mk for i ≤ m, k,m ∈ N.
Lemma 4 σ ki for i, k ∈ N is stopping time with respect to {Fn}∞n=0.
Proof Immediately from Lemma 3 and (11). 
Lemma 5 For m ∈ N, m ≥ 2, i ∈ {1, . . . ,m − 1}, on {τ i(k) > τm(k)} we have
σ ki = σ τ
m(k)+1
i .
Lemma 6 σ ki 
= σ kj for i 
= j .
Let ψˆm = (ψˆm,1, . . . , ψˆm,m), where ψˆm,i = {ψˆm,in }∞n=1 and
ψˆm,in = I
(
σ 1i ≤ n
)
, n ∈ N. (12)
From Lemma 4, we get that {ψˆm,in } is a sequence of 0-1 valued {Fn}-adapted random
variables. Hence, from Lemma 3, we get
ψˆm,i ∈ D1 (13)
for i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. According to the above profile, Player i in the m-person game will behave
in the same manner as Player i in the i-person game, that is,
ψˆm,i = ψˆ i,i . (14)
Proposition 1 σ im(ψˆm) = σ 1i for m ∈ N, i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
Proof Proof uses induction on i and Lemma 6. 
It follows from Proposition 1 that, for i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, Player i stops playing in the m-
person game at the same time as in the i-person game, that is, σ im(ψˆm) = σ ii (ψˆ i).













where τ i,mk are defined in (3).
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Hence, from Theorem 2 and (4) we get the assertion. 




) = γ i(0). (16)








, m ∈ N, i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. (17)
Using Theorem 3 and (17), we get
i∑
j=1
















Hence, Vi,i(ψˆ i) = γ i(0), which together with (17) gives the conclusion. 
Note that according to (17), the expected reward of Player i in the m-person game with
profile ψˆm is equal to the expected reward of Player i in the i-person game with profile ψˆ i .
Lemma 9 For each m,k ∈ N we have
sup
(τ1,...,τm)∈Mk(m)
E(Gτ1 + · · · + Gτm) = sup
τ1,...,τm∈Mk(1)
τ i 
=τ j ,i 
=j




E(Gτ1 + · · · + Gτm | Fk) = ess sup
τ1,...,τm∈Mk(1)
τ i 
=τ j ,i 
=j
E(Gτ1 + · · · + Gτm | Fk).
Proof Note that Mk(m) ⊆ {(τ 1, . . . , τm) : τ 1, . . . , τm ∈ Mk(1), τ i 
= τ j , i 
= j}. Let
τ 1, . . . , τm ∈ Mk(1) be any different stopping times. Define τ (1) = min{τ 1, . . . , τm}, τ (i) =
min{τ j : τ j > τ (i−1), j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}}, i = 2, . . . ,m. Then (τ (1), . . . , τ (m)) ∈ Mk(m). 
Theorem 4 The profile ψˆm is a Nash equilibrium in Dm1 .
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Note that from (7) and (8) we have σ jm((ψˆm)−i ,ψm,i) 
= σ lm((ψˆm)−i ,ψm,i), j 
= l. Hence,
from the definition of D1 and (13), we get σ km((ψˆm)−i ,ψm,i) ≤ τm,m1 + m < ∞. Therefore,































Finally, from (18), (19), and (16), we get Vm,i((ψˆm)−i ,ψm,i) ≤ γ i(0) = Vm,i(ψˆm). 
Let us recall that the profile ϕm ∈ Dm1 is Pareto-optimal in Dm1 if there does not exist a








and at least one of the above inequalities is strict.
Theorem 5 ψˆm ∈ Dm1 is Pareto-optimal in Dm1 .
Proof Assume that there exists ϕm ∈ Dm1 such that Vm,i(ϕm) ≥ Vm,i(ψˆm), i = 1,2, . . . ,m















E(Gτ1 + · · · + Gτm). (20)


























which with (20) gives a contradiction. 
In the proposition below, we will show that players in the m-person game will choose
the same rewards as those optimal in the multiple stopping problem. However, note that
the stopping time selected by Player i in the m-person game can be different from the ith
stopping in the multiple stopping problem.
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Proposition 2
{
σ k1 , . . . , σ
k
m
} = {τ 1,mk , . . . , τm,mk
}
. (21)
Define σ k(1) = min{σ k1 , . . . , σ km} and σ k(i) = min{σ kj : σ kj > σk(i−1), j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}} for i ∈
{1, . . . ,m}.
Corollary 1 σ k(i) = τ i,mk for i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
In Theorem 6 below, we will show that presented Nash equilibrium is a sub-game perfect
equilibrium. Let us remind that a sub-game perfect equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium if after
any history all remaining players’ strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium in the remaining
part of the game. Let V km,i(ψm) be conditional expected reward for Player i in the m-person
game at time of the k-th offer, that is, V km,i(ψm) = I(σ im(ψm) ≥ k)E(Gσim(ψm) | Fk−1). Note
that V 1m,i(ψm) = Vm,i(ψm).
Theorem 6 The profile ψˆm is a sub-game perfect equilibrium.
Summary In Theorem 4, we have proved that the strategy profile ψˆm is a Nash equilibrium.
According to the strategy, Player i in the m-person game behaves as Player i in the i-person
game (Eq. (14)). Moreover, their selected stopping times and expected rewards are equal
(Proposition 1 and Eq. (17)). Additionally, the expected reward of Player i in the m-person
game in Nash equilibrium is equal to the expected reward from selling the ith good in the
future, if there are i instead of i − 1 goods for sale (Lemma 8).
Example 1 Let us consider three-person game. We show that the player with the low-















τ 3(1) + 1) + 1) = τ 3,31 .







1 , if τ 2(1) > τ 3(1),
τ
2,3
1 , if τ 2(1) = τ 3(1) and τ 1(τ 3(1) + 1) > τ 2(τ 3(1) + 1),
τ
3,3
1 , if τ 2(1) = τ 3(1) and τ 1(τ 3(1) + 1) = τ 2(τ 3(1) + 1).
In a similar way, we obtain that Player 2 in three-person game will finish the game at one of
the two stopping times: τ 1,21 , τ
2,2





1 , if τ 1(1) > τ 2(1),
τ
2,2
1 , if τ 1(1) = τ 2(1).
Moreover, the player with the highest priority will finish the game at σ 11 = τ 1,11 .
Note that the ith player’s stopping time is different from the optimal time of selling the
ith commodity, but his expected reward is equal to the optimal expected reward, which can
be obtained from selling the ith commodity.
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3 Discussion
In this section, we compare in detail the results obtained in this paper with those presented
in Ferenstein and Krasnosielska [8]. Let us briefly present the solution obtained in [8]. There
it is assumed that there exist continuous functions Vˆm,i(·) such that Vˆm,i(u) ≤ Vˆm,i−1(u), i ∈
{2, . . . ,m}, u ∈ R+0 , where Vˆm,i(u) is an“optimal” mean reward of Player i in the m-person
game with reward structure Gn(u) = Ynr(u + Tn). Next, there are defined Markov times
τˆ i (u) = inf{n ≥ 1 : Gn(u) ≥ Vˆm,i(u + Tn)}, i = 1,2, . . . ,m, which are used to construct the
following strategy:
− Player 1 finishes the game at Markov time τˆ m(u) if and only if τˆ 1(u) = τˆ m(u); if τˆ 1(u) >
τˆm(u), then Player 1 behaves as Player 1 in the m − 1-person game starting at Markov
time τˆ m(u) + 1;
− Player i, i ∈ {2, . . . ,m − 1}, finishes the game at Markov time τˆ m(u) if and only if
τˆ i−1(u) > τˆ i(u) = τˆ m(u); if τˆ i−1(u) = τˆ m(u), then Player i behave as Player i − 1 in
the m − 1-person game starting at τˆ m(u) + 1; if τˆ i (u) > τˆm(u), then Player i behaves as
Player i in the m − 1-person game starting at τˆ m(u) + 1;
− Player m finishes the game at Markov time τˆ m(u) if and only if τˆ m−1(u) > τˆm(u); if
τˆ m−1(u) = τˆ m(u), then Player m behaves as Player m − 1 in the m − 1-person game
starting at τˆ m(u) + 1.
Next, it is proved that Player i stops in the i-person game at the same time as in the m-
person game and in consequence the “optimal” expected reward of Player i in the m-person
game is equal to the “optimal” expected reward of Player i in the i-person game, that is,
Vˆm,i(u) = Vˆi,i (u). To compute Vˆi,i (·), it was assumed Vˆm,1(u) = Vˆ1,1(u) and for i ≥ 2




τˆ i−1(u) > τˆ i(u)
) + Vˆi−1,i−1(u)I
(
τˆ i−1(u) = τˆ i (u))), (22)
where Vˆ1,1(u) is the optimal expected reward in the Elfving problem. Hence, as in the Elfv-
ing problem, for each i ∈ {2, . . . ,m} the differential equations describing Vˆi,i (·) have been
obtained. Next, it was stated (without proof) that the equations obtained have exactly one
solution. Moreover, there were given some arguments suggesting that the profile is a Nash
equilibrium. Note that the assumption given by (22) is a modification of those made in Elfv-
ing [6], and it was removed in Siegmund [18].
Note that the differential equations obtained in Ferenstein and Krasnosielska [8] are the
same as those in Stadje [19], that is,
Vˆm,i(u) = γ i(u). (23)
From (16), w have that the expected reward of Player i in the m-person game with profile
ψˆm is equal to γ i(0). Hence, from (16), (23), and Theorem 4 we get that the profile is a Nash
equilibrium.
The connections between the problem solved in Stadje [19] and the solution of the game
presented in Ferenstein and Krasnosielska [8] are discussed in detail in the doctoral disser-
tation of Krasnosielska [14].
4 Proofs
Proof of Lemma 3 From (3), for i = 1, we have σ k1 = τ 1(k) = τ 1,1k . Assume that for each
k ∈ N we have σ ki−1 ≤ τ i−1,i−1k . We will show that σ ki ≤ τ i,ik . From (11) and Lemma 2, we
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have
σ ki ≤ σ τ
i (k)+1
i−1 ≤ τ i−1,i−1τ i (k)+1 = τ i,ik .
The second inequality in Lemma 3 follows from (6). 




τm(k) + 1) = n, τ i(k) > τm(k)} = {τ i(k) = n, τ i(k) > τm(k)} (24)
for i ∈ {1, . . . ,m − 1} and k,n ∈ N. From (6), we obtain τ i(τm(k) + 1) ≤ τm−i+1,mk <
∞. Hence, the stopping times appearing in (24) are finite. Therefore, from (24) on
{τ i(k) > τm(k)}, we have
τ i
(
τm(k) + 1) = τ i(k). (25)
Consider two cases. If i = 1, then from (10) and (25), we get the assertion of the lemma.
Let i ∈ {2, . . . ,m − 1}. From (5), we get {τ i−1(k) > τm(k)} ⊇ {τ i(k) > τm(k)}. Therefore,
from (25) on {τ i(k) > τm(k)} we have τ i−1(τm(k) + 1) = τ i−1(k). Hence, from (25) on





τ i(k), if τ i−1(k) > τ i(k),
σ
τi (k)+1
i−1 , if τ i−1(k) = τ i(k)
= σ ki . 
Proof of Lemma 6 It is enough to show that σ ki 
= σ kj , j < i. The proof uses induction on i.
From (11) on {τ 1(k) > τ 2(k)} is σ k2 = τ 2(k) < τ 1(k) = σ k1 . Additionally, on {τ 1(k) = τ 2(k)}
σ k2 = σ τ
2(k)+1
1 = τ 1
(
τ 2(k) + 1) = τ 1(τ 1(k) + 1) > τ 1(k) = σ k1 .
Hence, σ k2 
= σ k1 .
Assume that σ ki−1 
= σ kj for j ∈ {1,2, . . . , i − 2}, k ∈ N.
We will prove that σ ki 
= σ kj for j ∈ {1, . . . , i − 1}. From (11) on {τ i−1(k) > τ i(k)}
σ ki = τ i(k) < τ i−1(k) ≤ τ j (k) ≤ σ kj , (26)
where we used (5) and (11). It should still be shown that σ ki 
= σ kj on {τ i−1(k) = τ i(k)}.
Consider two cases. Let j = 1. On {τ 1(k) = τ i(k)} we have σ ki = σ τ
i (k)+1
i−1 = σ τ
1(k)+1
i−1 >






σ k1 , where we used the induction assumption and Lemma 5. Hence, σ ki 
= σ k1 . Now, let





j−1 = σ τ
j (k)+1
j−1 = σ kj .
On {τ j−1(k) > τj (k) = τ i(k)} we have σ ki = σ τ
i (k)+1
i−1 > τ
i(k) = τ j (k) = σ kj . On {τ j−1(k) ≥





j = σ kj ,
where we used the induction assumption and Lemma 5. Hence, for j ∈ {1, . . . , i − 1} on
{τ i−1(k) = τ i(k)}, we have σ ki 
= σ kj , which together with (26) completes the proof. 
Proof of Lemma 7 The proof uses induction on m. Note that for each k ∈ N, we have σ k1 =
τ 1(k) = τ 1,1k . Hence, for m = 1, we get (15). Now assume that for each k ∈ N and given
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where above, the middle equality follows from Lemma 2 and τm(k) = τ 1,mk , which follows
from (3).





















τ i−1(k) = τ i(k))
= Gτm(k)I
(
τ 1(k) = τm(k)) + Gσk1 I
(


































τ i−1(k) = τ i(k) > τm(k)), (28)
where the last equality follows from (10) and (5). Adding the first and third summands
appearing on the right side of the above equality, and using (5), we obtain
Gτm(k)I
(





τ i−1(k) > τ i(k) = τm(k)) = Gτm(k). (29)
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τ i(k) > τm(k)
)
. (30)
Now, plugging (29) and (30) into (28), and changing the index of summation in the last but
one summand on the right side of (28) we get the final form of (28) as follows:
Gτm(k) + Gσk1 I
(
























































τ i(k) > τm(k)
)
,
where the last equality is a consequence of Lemma 5. Hence, (27) is true. 
Proof of Proposition 2 The proof uses induction. For m = 1, the assertion follows imme-
diately from (10) and (3). Assume that {σ k1 , . . . , σ km−1} = {τ 1,m−1k , . . . , τm−1,m−1k }. We will




k , . . . , τ
m,m
k
} = {τm(k), τ 1,m−1τm(k)+1, . . . , τm−1,m−1τm(k)+1
}





Note that the set {σ k1 , . . . , σ km} has m different elements (Lemma 6) and the set {τ 1,mk ,
. . . , τ
m,m
k } has also m different elements. Therefore, from (31), it is enough to show that










We will consider three cases. Let i = m, then from (11) we have σ km ∈ {τm(k), σ τ
m(k)+1
m−1 }. Let
now i ∈ {2, . . . ,m − 1}. Then from Lemma 5 and (11), we have




τm(k) < τ i(k)
) + τ i(k)I(τm(k) = τ i(k) < τ i−1(k))
+ σ τi (k)+1i−1 I
(
τm(k) = τ i−1(k))
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Let i = 1, then from Lemma 5 and (11) we have σ k1 = σ τ
m(k)+1
1 I(τ
m(k) < τ 1(k)) +
τ 1(k)I(τm(k) = τ 1(k)) ∈ {σ τm(k)+11 , τm(k)}. 
Proof of Theorem 6 Assume that we are just before the observation of the kth offer and
up to this time l ≤ m players remain in the game, say players numbered i1, . . . , il . Let I =
{i1, . . . , il}. Note that only players i1, . . . , il remain in the game up to the time of observation
of the kth offer if and only if σ ijm (ψˆm) ≥ k for each j ∈ {1, . . . , l} and σ jm(ψˆm) < k for each



















We want to prove that for ψm = (ψm,1, . . . ,ψm,m) ∈ Dm1 such that {ψm,in }k−1n=1 = {ψˆm,in }k−1n=1,











Note that A = ⋂j∈I{σ jm(ψm) ≥ k} ∩
⋂
j∈{1,...,m}\I{σ jm(ψm) < k} for profile ψm defined
above. Moreover, according to (11), σ 1ij = σ kj on A for j ∈ {1, . . . , l}. Therefore, from (9)











































































where we used (15) and Lemma 1. As in Theorem 4, we have σ jm((ψˆm)−i ,ψm,i) 
=
σ lm((ψˆ
m)−i ,ψm,i), j 
= l, and σ jm((ψˆm)−i ,ψm,i) ≤ τm,m1 + m < ∞. Therefore, using










≤ I(A) ess sup
τ1,...,τn∈Mk(1)
τ j1 
























γ j (Tk−1), (33)
where we used the result of Kösters [11, Lemma 5] and Lemma 1. Finally, from (32), (33),

















































where in the last but one equality we used (15). 
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